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This paper addresses Japan’s economy, its new economic policy package, 
and the new term – Abenomics – that is used to describe the three pillars, or 
“arrows,” of the Abe government’s focus on the Japanese economy and on 
economic policy. The term Abenomics is an example of brilliant branding. At the 
same time it is risky, since it implies Prime Minister Abe’s success or failure will 
depend on the success or failure of Abenomics. This paper makes three major 
points. First, it is far too early to tell whether Abenomics will be successful – in 
ending deflation, bringing about price stability and getting the economy onto a 
stable, full employment growth path. Second, perhaps the most important change is 
the shift in people’s feelings about Japan’s future, from resignation to optimistic 
hope. However it is not at all clear that this new mindset will become deeply 
engrained and sustained. Third, we should distinguish between Abe as Prime 
Minister and Abenomics. 
 
  
                                                          
1 This paper is based on the keynote speech presented at the STAJE Conference, Stanford University, 
June 6-9, 2013. 
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This paper addresses Japan’s economy, its new economic policy package, 
and the new term – Abenomics – that is used to describe the three pillars, or 
“arrows,” of the Abe government’s focus on the Japanese economy and on 
economic policy. The term Abenomics is an example of brilliant branding. At the 
same time it is risky, since it implies Prime Minister Abe’s success or failure will 
depend on the success or failure of Abenomics.  Before going into more detail, this 
paper makes three major points. 
First, it is far too early to tell whether Abenomics will be successful – in 
ending deflation, bringing about price stability and getting the economy onto a 
stable, full employment growth path. The initial evidence is certainly positive, but 
there is a long way to go. 
Second, perhaps the most important change is the shift in people’s feelings 
about Japan’s future, from resignation – sho ga nai – to optimistic hope. 
Revitalization is a somewhat strange term, especially regarding the economy, but 
that is one catch word that is being used. Economists use the term expectations, but 
what is going on is deeper than that. This optimism is propelled in large part 
because many Japanese are sick and tired of the malaise of the past two decades, 
and have been eager to buy into Abenomics, probably a lot more than buying into 
Abe himself as an outstanding leader. However it is not at all clear that this new 
mindset will become deeply engrained and sustained. 
Third, we should distinguish between Abe and Abenomics. It is possible that 
both will succeed. Or it is possible that Abe will fail as Prime Minister but that his 
successor will embrace the Abenomics economic policy program, and forward 
momentum will continue. Or, the three arrow package will not be implemented 
sufficiently well, and Abenomics and Abe will fail. But that does not mean the end 




It is easy to label Japan as having suffered from its so-called two lost 
decades. In a broad sense that is true – modest but pernicious deflation, inadequate 
domestic demand, mediocre growth below potential, weak labor markets and a 
widespread sense of malaise. Over the period growth has been volatile—
recessions, recoveries, growth, the sharp decline in 2009 as the global Great 
Recession hit all high income countries, Japan’s partial recovery and then slide 
back to modest recession again in 2012, and now rapid recovery—at least this year. 
But that is too simple a statement of what has been going on in Japan over 
the past two decades.  
First, there has been a great deal of change in institutions, organizations, 
corporate and personal behavior, generational values, and various other changes 
below the radar screen. Japan is quite different today from 20 years ago.  
Second, the demographic realities of a declining labor force since 1995 and 
now declining population have already had a big effect and will continue to have a 
big effect; and they provide lessons for Korea and China as well as Europe.  
Nevertheless, Japan has not done so badly in a comparative context. We 
have to stop focusing simply on GDP growth rates, given the new demographic 
context, and emphasize the growth of GDP per capita, GDP growth per worker, 
and especially labor productivity, Japan has done better than Europe, and almost as 
well as the US in the past decade, with even higher growth rates of these variables 
in the 1990s. Japan’s performance should not be so surprising, since its labor 
productivity and GDP/capita are still below that of France, Germany, and the UK, 
and especially the US where the gap has actually been widening. However, Japan’s 
good productivity performance has been hidden in aggregate terms by the decline 
in the Japanese labor force. Nonetheless, even with that decline, Japanese labor is 
still misallocated and underutilized, due to poor growth relative to potential and the 
employment system rigidity for regular workers. 
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Japan will grow well this year – maybe 2.5% or so – but that alone will not be 
enough to end deflation and provide sustained growth in the longer run. That’s 
why Prime Minister Abe’s top priority of economic policy is so important. 
 Abenomics has three interrelated components – or arrows. The first is a 
dramatically expansive monetary policy initiated April 4 and anticipated well 
before the appointment of Governor Kuroda and Deputy Governors Iwata and 
Nakaso, who took office March 20. 
 The second arrow is fiscal stimulus, embodied in the very large 
supplementary budget (10.3 trillion yen) passed in March, in the fiscal year ending 
March 30. The third arrow, the most important and the most difficult, is the long-
run growth strategy, based on a range of structural reforms.  
 Like most observers, I certainly had expected the Bank of Japan to take a 
new and bold monetary easing policy when its Monetary Policy Board met on 
April 4. However, the new policy package is dramatically stronger than I, and 
apparently most others, expected, and unprecedentedly so. “Shock and awe” was 
an appropriate phrase some commentators have used. The Japanese stock market 
immediately rose sharply, and the yen weakened further.  
In addition to the measures now being implemented, if necessary, the Bank 
of Japan could even purchase more exchange traded funds, taking on more credit 
risk and signaling that it is prepared to do anything and everything to end deflation. 
The Bank of Japan is pursuing two seemingly contradictory policies at once. 
Most important, its goal is to end deflation and achieve an increase in prices on the 
order of two percent of the consumer price index, which translates into about one 
percent annual increase is the GDP deflator. That means that a nominal interest 
rate of one percent would be equivalent to a real interest rate of zero. On the other 
hand, the BOJ wants to keep nominal interest rates, not only short term but 
especially long term, very low in order to encourage investment and consumer 
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durables spending. The yield on ten-year Japanese government bonds is a market 
benchmark. In the near term, the BOJ apparently aims to keep the JGB yield below 
one percent. In other words, it wants real interest rates to be negative or zero 
during the present transition recovery period. 
Since the government debt and amount of JGBs outstanding is huge, 
increases in interest rates reduce JGB prices and bring about substantial capital 
losses to government debt holders. Moreover, monetary policy implementation has 
led to significant increases in the volatility of JGB prices, with increased 
uncertainty leading to a higher risk premium. The riskiness of JGBs so far has not 
been credit risk – risk of default – but capital loss risks. However default risk – a 
JGB market crisis – is eventually in the making since continued large government 
budget deficits and JGB issue are unsustainable in the long run, as Professor Takeo 
Hoshi and others have well analyzed. 
The current volatility has certainly shaken up the JGB market, and the JGB 
yield has recently gone from its bottom point of 0.4 percent to almost one percent – 
and deflation has yet to end, so positive real yields persist. The monetary policy 
challenge is to reduce real interest rates during this transition period, by keeping 
the rises in the JGB yields below the improvements in the CPI. 
We should not be surprised by the increased volatility in the JGB market or 
the stock market.  Those are probably inevitable big hiccups in the adjustment 
process.  
 The second arrow – fiscal policy – has a clear direction and target in the near 
term, but its longer run strategy is not yet set. This is in part because of the 
uncertainties as to how quickly and how strongly monetary policy will be effective 
in ending deflation and stimulating demand. 
 The current fiscal stimulus is essential. Fiscal and monetary policies are 
necessary complements for an effective macroeconomic policy. In general terms 
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these new government expenditures follow traditional LDP public works 
programs, many of which were not very productive. However, this time in addition 
to the ongoing rehabilitation of Fukushima, some public works involve much-
needed repair of bridges, tunnels, and other parts of much earlier infrastructure 
investments. But perhaps I am being too optimistic; political pork barrels have not 
disappeared. 
Japan faces four fiscal policy issues. First, when should fiscal stimulus be 
ended, and replaced by fiscal consolidation? Fiscal consolidation should not be 
done prematurely. Deflation has to be brought to an end first and a stable full 
employment growth path established.  
Second, should the currently enacted consumption tax increase from 5 percent 
to 8 percent in April 2014 and to 10 percent in October 2015 be allowed to go into 
effect, or should they be delayed? I hope they will stay in place, but I don’t know. 
It depends on how the economy is doing this coming fall, when a decision has to 
be made in October. 
Third, once fiscal consolidation becomes the proper policy over the longer term, 
what further taxes, not only the consumption tax, should be raised, by how much 
and over what long-term time frame? Japan’s tax system needs to be revised and 
restructured. In principle national taxes should not be increased further on 
consumption, which needs to be encouraged, but on assets… but as of now, that 
seems politically impossible. 
 Fourth, to what degree should government current pension, medical care and 
other welfare programs be cut in order to restrain government expenditure growth 
as the population ages? The trade-off between social welfare expenditures and 
taxes is a major issue in all societies.  
In terms of the first two arrows – macroeconomic monetary and fiscal 
policies - Japan is on the right path. But it is far too early to see other than short-
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run results. To repeat, one key is expectations – both about ending of deflation and 
about restoring full employment growth. Even before Abe was elected, Japanese 
expectations shifted positively. A year ago in Japan the attitude was one of 
resignation, of sho ga nai; now it is one of hope, as earlier noted. 
 It is difficult to manage expectations. Sustaining positive expectations needs 
more than hope, it needs action which so far we are seeing – and it needs results, 
which takes time to achieve. 
 The third arrow – structural reforms to achieve better economic growth in 
the longer term – is both the most necessary and important, and the most difficult 
to achieve. It is not a single arrow, but rather a package of arrows. One danger is 
that too many reforms will be defined as elements of the third arrow, and the target 
will be a big blob, with lots of darts rather than big arrows. A few priorities have to 
be defined and given high policy focus. 
 Fiscal and monetary policy alone cannot provide good, stable, long-run 
growth, but they do provide the underlying policy environment. Market 
liberalization and structural reforms are needed in Japan to create new 
opportunities for companies to invest – both in services and in agriculture. It is not 
simply a matter of blanket deregulation – it is the right kind of regulation which is 
supportive both of competitive markets and of consumer safety and security. 
 The growth strategy report was announced by the Prime Minister on June 
14. It was essentially based on the Industrial Competitiveness Council report of 
May 29. There, the Council outlined three broad strategies for growth, each with 
topics or goals. The first is industrial revival, including industry restructuring, 
labor market reform, IT, innovation and help for SMEs. The second strategy is to 
create new growth markets, centering on health care, energy, infrastructure and 
agriculture and fishing industries. The third strategy emphasizes globalization; 
promoting strategic trade relationships such as TPP, trade and foreign investment 
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inflows and outflows, and globalizing Japanese human resources, which I assume 
means learning English or other foreign languages.  
Since the long-run growth strategy was announced only five weeks before 
the upcoming Lower House election, it is not surprising that the specification of 
priorities and implementation procedures was somewhat vague.  Presumably those 
are to be clarified in the late summer and early fall, following the election, 
according to the June 14 report. It is essential that Abe define a few policy 
priorities and push them hard. Japan’s decision to join the TPP negotiations is a 
major step forward, but that alone will not be enough. The problem is that 
established vested interests, not only in agriculture, are strong and will resist 
changes.  
 The government has already addressed the major sector of electric power 
generation and distribution.  The cabinet approved a sweeping electricity power 
reform on April 2. It involves a drastic restructuring of the electric power system 
by forcing the major electric power regional monopolies to separate their 
electricity production from its transmission and distribution, to make it possible for 
new entrants to produce electricity and sell it to the grid, and enter and develop 
electricity transmission networks. As always, the devil lies in the details, which 
will be spelled out over the course of the next two years. There will be significant 
political fights, since the public utility companies were very powerful and probably 
still are despite their pre-Fukushima scandalous assertions that all their nuclear 
power plants were completely safe. 
Council members are significantly divided in their fundamental approach to 
reform. One group wants to deregulate and free up markets, thereby creating 
opportunities for private companies to enter previously protected markets and 
niches. The other group’s view is that the government should give priority to new 
industrial policy initiatives, and provide new funding in support.  Both views are 
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incorporated into the Council’s growth strategy outline, but it seems that the 
industrial policy group was more powerful. I worry about government funding for 
smaller so-called “winner” firms that are not able to borrow from banks but that 
are presumed to have dormant patents and technologies which could profitably be 
developed commercially.  In practice such funding could simply mean continuing 
to support some 40,000 or so SME zombie companies as well as some larger 
zombie firms.  
It is really important that the emphasis on freeing up markets become the 
fundamental basis for deregulation and structural reform – relying more on markets 
than on government-based funding to bring about structural reform and growth in 
the long run.  
I assume the LDP will win the July Upper House election and stay in power for 
another 3 years, and Abe will be Prime Minister for a further 3 years or longer 
unless he makes some terrible mistake or his health becomes bad, or for some 
reason a Lower House election is held sooner. Right now Abe seems a new man – 
energetic, self-confident, well briefed and demonstrating considerable leadership. I 
assume he wants to win the next election in 2016, and stay in power for an even 
longer period. If so, he has to focus primarily on the economy, not on his 
ideological predilections. 
Will he do that, or will he use his political chips to push for comprehensive 
constitutional reforms and other domestic, and foreign, policies which represent his 
fundamentally nationalistic thinking? Will he continue to be a pragmatist, or will 
his right-wing nationalist objectives prevail?  
In terms of the third arrow, if Abe is willing to bear the political costs, he will 
have a one-year or so window of opportunity after the July election to push 
structural reform measures though. Vested interests will be angry and his public 
popularity will go down. But no elections will be held for three years. Over time 
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people will calm down, particularly if Abenomics achieves its goals and the feeling 
is that Japan has become revitalized. The danger of course is that if Abe does not 
carry out structural reform, and reduces emphasis to economic policy, that 
Abenomics will not succeed.  Then Abe and the LDP will have a tough time in the 
2016 Upper House election, when a simultaneous Lower House election might 
well be scheduled. 
 Japan’s economy will do well for the next 12 to 15 months, but after that I 
am much less sure. I continue to worry about inadequate domestic demand, a major 
structural problem for two decades. Will structural reform and improvements in 
expectations lead companies to invest more at home? Will the economy grow well 
enough that labor becomes tight, and companies have to raise wages? Now that 
household saving rates are so low, sustained increases in consumption spending 
require household incomes to rise, and for most families that depends 
fundamentally upon wage increases. 
 When will the Abe government succeed in ending deflation? How long will 
that process take? I am concerned less about the specific 2 percent inflation target 
than I am about the maintenance of optimistic expectations. Even if the CPI rises 
less than a 2 percent annual rate within the next two years, if people think that 
deflation has ended and growth performance will be better, that will be good 
enough.  
In conclusion, obviously the first big challenge for monetary policy – and 
indeed for macroeconomic policy – is to end deflation definitively. With monetary 
reforms and good growth achieved, then that will be the time to tackle the long-run 
problem of fiscal consolidation, which will require eventually raising taxes even 
further, as well as constraining pension expenditures. But fiscal consolidation 
should not happen prematurely. There is no contradiction between fiscal stimulus 
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and fiscal stabilization. It is essentially a matter of timing. It is really costly to 
pursue austerity before full employment growth is sustained. 
 So I am optimistic about Abenomics for the next year or so, but beyond that 
I feel quite uncertain because I don’t know how the third arrow package will be 
defined and implemented. The comings months following the election will be 
important for many issues – the third arrow implementation policies, Diet 
legislation proposals, the October deadline on whether to implement the 
consumption tax increase from 5% to 8% on April 1, 2014, and the government 
budget formulation in November for the next fiscal year. At worst, Japan will 
somehow muddle through.  
